How to Avoid AIRBUS II: A Primer For Domestic Industry by Manner, Jennifer A.
How To AVOID AIRBUS II:
A PRIMER FOR DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
JENNIFER A. MANNER*
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the threat of European Community ("EC") high technology'
international consortiums ("consortia")2 that produce fully assembled
products,3 have become a concern for the United States. It is not the actual
formation of EC consortia that are the cause for alarm, but that they will
often be subsidized by EC member state governments4 as demonstrated by
Airbus Industrie ("Airbus").5
To date Airbus is the primary EC subsidized consortia that concerns the
U.S and its domestic industries. However, this is bound to change as EC
member states enter into closer economic and political collaboration with one
another in an effort to gain international market share.6
There are three other primary reasons why EC subsidized consortia in
high-tech industries are likely to be formed. The first involves the French
law under which Airbus was created. French law has crafted a special form
of partnership, a Groupement d'Interet Economique, which is conducive to
the formation of EC consortia.7 A legal entity formed under this law is not
* Attorney at Federal Communications Commission, Common Carrier Bureau (the views
expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Communications
Commission). Member New York and Connecticut Bars; LL.M. International and Comparative
Law, with distinction, Georgetown University Law Center, 1992; J.D. cum laude, New York
Law School, 1991; B.A. State University of New York at Albany, 1986.
1. This article is concerned with high-tech EC consortia because of the large sums of money
that are necessary to start-up and run such industries.
2. For the purposes of this article, international consortia are defined as commercial
enterprises whose members are companies of different states and their respective governments
who are signatories of political and economic support agreements.
3. As opposed to component parts.
4. This article presumes that the entire EC will not be involved with a consortia, but only
several member states. Hence, the term EC denotes that these consortia consist of only several
EC member state governments.
5. Richard W. Stevenson, Will Aerospace be the Next Casualty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992,§ 3, at 1, 6. See Making Air Waves-Turbulence-Tensions Rise as Trade Talks Approach with
Subsidized Airbus, SEATLE TIMES, Sept. 20, 1990, at BI [hereinafter Making Air Waves]; see
also Outside Chance of Senate Trade Bill Passage by Independence Day Recess, 4 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 838 (July 1, 1987). Presently, there other subsidized EC consortia that may fit this
description: European Arianespace, Eureka Electronics and Jessi Semi-Conductors.
6. See, e.g., Richard Wright, Comment on "The World Trading System After the Uruguay
Round," 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 287, 288 (1990).
7. Gellman Research Associates, An Economic and Financial Review of Airbus Industrie, at
1-2 (Sept. 4, 1990) [hereinafter Gellman] (on file at California Western International Law
Journal).
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required to report financial results,' thereby protecting subsidies given to the
consortia by member state governments from public scrutiny.
Secondly, since participation costs are expensive in high-tech industries,
many of these EC consortia will only be able to start-up and remain
competitive through member state government infusions of monies granted
or loaned at non-commercial rates.9 Therefore, subsidization will likely
exist through a portion of the consortia's lifetime.
The last reason why there may be a surge in the formation of subsidized
EC consortia is that there are several immeasurable non-monetary benefits
the member state governments and the EC receive. These include: spill
over effects into other industries; national prestige; and support for other
domestic and foreign policy objectives.' 0 Therefore, the cost of subsidizing
the consortia may be offset by non-monetary benefits accruing to the member
state governments. This rational has been attributed as a reason for the long-
term subsidies that Airbus' member state governments have contributed to the
consortia."
Since EC subsidized consortia are likely to increase as an economic
threat to U.S. industry, it is important that the U.S. prepare to meet their
challenge. This article will examine how the U.S. handled the Airbus threat
in the forum of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and
why that was and is an ineffective forum to protect U.S. high-tech industries.
Secondly, the recent agreement reached between the U.S. and the EC over
Airbus subsidization will be explored, including its problems and justifica-
tions. Next, this article will examine several benefits that U.S. domestic
industry competing against a subsidized EC consortia can gain by taking
action under the U.S. countervailing duty law and Section 301 of the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974. These were unavailable in the GATT actions against
Airbus. Finally, this article will look at whether the benefits achieved by the
U.S. unfair trade laws outweigh their negative aspects for U.S. high-tech
industry in fighting a subsidized EC consortia.
I. AIRBUS: A CASE STUDY
"Anyone who thinks there is going to be a winner in a trade war of this
kind is drinking some very strange beverage."12
Airbus is an international consortium consisting of four EC member state
government sponsored aircraft manufacturers, the Deutsche Airbus unit of
8. Id.
9. See Guy De Jonquieres, A New Landscape Takes Shape, THE FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1989,
at 20.
10. Gellman, supra note 7, at 1-10.
11. Id.
12. Steven Dryden, Jet Makers Inch Toward World Trade Market: U.S. Industry Opposes
European Competitor's Subsidies, Nov. 29, 1991, THE RECORDER, at 1 (quoting Alan Boyd).
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Germany's Daimler-Benz AG, Britain's British Aerospace PLC, France's
Aerospatiale and Spain's Casa.13 Airbus, (formed in 1968), was "designed
to catapult Europe into the commercial aviation business that the U.S. had
dominated since World War II."" It has accomplished this mission, but
only with large member state government subsidization.15
The governments of the member companies are signatories of agreements
among themselves that guarantee political and financial support for Airbus
programs.16 Furthermore, as evidenced by the negotiating stance of Airbus
in GATI' recently, it unsuprisingly has the support of the EC. 1 This will
not be an unprecedented alliance in EC consortia, as the EC seeks to expand
its economic success and prestige in high-tech areas that it only recently has
begun exploiting.18
Airbus is now a peculiar EC success story. As of December 31, 1990
it had delivered 652 new aircraft19 and its "share of commercial aircraft
orders has almost quadrupled in the past decade, from 7 percent in 1980 to
27 percent [in 1989]-close to the consortium target of gaining a 30 percent
market share by the mid-1990s." °  During the same time period, the
market share of U.S. manufacturers declined from eighty-seven percent in
1980 to sixty-four percent in 1989.21
Airbus' gain in market share caused the two U.S. civil aircraft
manufacturers, Boeing Co. ("Boeing") and McDonnell Douglas ("McAir"),
to lose a substantial amount of sales.' These manufacturers and the U.S.
13. McDonnell Douglas Asks U.S. to Broaden Airbus Subsidy Charges, REUTER BUSINESS
REPORT, May 15, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File; see U.S. Weighs Trade
Charges Against Airbus, CIE. TRIB., May 8, 1991, at C3.
14. See Stuart Auerbach, Turbulence Ahead for the Airbus Talks; Bush Administration
Threatens Trade Complaint if Subsidy Issue Isn't Settled by Sept. 30, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,
1990, at H 1; see also Making Air Waves, supra note 5, at B1; Monthly Import/Business Review
1991 ITC LEXIS 1241, Dec. 1991, available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library.
15. See generally Gellman, supra note 7 (discussing the subsidization of Airbus and its effects
on the civil aircraft industry).
16. Gellman, supra note 7, at ES-i. Each of the Airbus company members is a diversified
aerospace manufacturer that serves the civil and military markets. Id. at 1-8. Airbus member
companies have agreed not to undertake programs that are competitive to Airbus programs either
by themselves or in partnership with other non-Airbus companies. Id. at 5-1.
17. See Airbus Consortium Countries Pledge to Negotiate with U.S. in GATT Framework, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 978 (June 26, 1991); Airbus Allegations that U.S. Firms Receive
Subsidies are Diversion Attempts, USTR Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 532 (Apr. 13, 1988).
18. For example, a similar alliance has occurred with Arianespace.
19. Monthly Import/Business Review, supra note 14, at 1241.
20. Auerbach, supra note 14, at HI.
21. Id.
22. For example, McAir has decreased dramatically its production rate for its MD-II civil
aircraft, at least in part because of foreign competition. See Bruce Smith, MD-11 Production Hit
by Industry Slump, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 26, 1992, at 18; Anthony L. Velocci,
Jr. U.S. Aerospace Firms Seek Greater Government Support, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 24, 1992, at 33; See also Making Air Waves, supra note 5, at BI. The potential for lost
sales is still growing. See Now, Airbus is Cruising Comfortably, BUS. WK. July 27, 1992, at
33.
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alleged that the reason for Airbus' "commercial" success was that it utilized
large government subsidies from its member state governments, equaling
US$13.5 billion.' If interest is calculated at the approximate commercial
rate for borrowing in Europe, the total level of subsidization would rise to
approximately US$26 billion.2'
Adding insult to injury to the U.S. and its civil aircraft industry is that
Airbus has never made a profit on the sale of its aircraft.' Airbus
programs, whether taken individually or as a group, have not achieved
commercial viability.' All Airbus programs have had a negative net present
value when cash flows are discounted at an average rate of 8.7% per year,
which reflects the rate of commercial borrowing costs in Europe. 7
If member state governments are repaid, neither they nor Airbus would
receive a positive net present value from their participation in Airbus
programs.' For member state governments this means that even if
repayment was made, it would not be sufficient to provide an 8.7% real
return on their investments.' For Airbus, repayment would only worsen
its financial picture leading to reduced company nominal cash flow and it is
unlikely that consortium would be able to repay the governmental funds
advanced for many of its aircraft programs.'
A. Basic Views of Industry on the Airbus Threat
"It can be concluded that [Airbus] was able to enter and remain in the
commercial aircraft industry only through substantial amounts of govern-
ment support."'"
The positions taken by Boeing, the world civil aircraft market leader,
and McAir, who has been pushed out of the number two spot in the industry
by its EC competitor,32 against Airbus subsidization typify the position that
similarly situated high-tech industries would probably take. As with most
high-tech manufacturers, Boeing and McAir perceive their future commercial
23. Gellman, supra note 7, at 2-3.
24. Id.
25. Making Air Waves, supra note 5, at BI.
26. Gellman, supra note 7, at 4-3 to 4-8. ("Commercial viability" is defined as what a
'private-sector finm would be willing to invest in a project; that is, expected revenues exceed
all costs, including repayment of government supports, by an amount sufficient to defray the cost
of funds employed.") Id. at 4-3.
27. Gellman, supra note 7, at ES-I; see Making Air Waves, supra note 5, at BI.
28. Gellman, supra note 7, at 4-6.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Gellman, supra note 7, at 2-13.
32. Dryden, supra note 12, at 1.
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success in their access to global markets.' However, they feared that
Airbus, because of its subsidization and political and economic ties, would
eventually make it extremely difficult for them to sell their products on a
competitive basis in the U.S. and foreign markets.
Their fear of limited access to foreign markets was justified by the
political and economic ties that this EC consortia has in Western Europe.
Not only are the Airbus member state governments tied by political and
economic agreements via the consortium, but they have economic and
political ties to the rest of Western Europe through the Treaty of Rome and
the European Free Trade Association.' This political and economic
cohesion will increase in intensity as more nations gain associated and
permanent status in the EC.35 Because of these ties, the Airbus member
states and many European nations may purchase Airbus aircraft, rather than
U.S. aircraft, to demonstrate their support to Europe. 6
Boeing and McAir's fear of the economic effect of Airbus subsidization
is not unfounded in light of the civil aircraft marketplace, which is limited
to the sale of only several hundred aircraft per year worldwide. 7 Given
this limited number of sales, very few civil aircraft manufacturers sell
enough aircraft to take advantage of declining production costs and to cover
their sunk costs.38 A similar market situation exists in most high-tech
industries which effectively limits the number of entrants and the number of
manufacturers who can remain commercially viable in a given high-tech
industrial sector.
This market scenario originally allowed Boeing and McAir to become
world leaders in the civil aircraft industry. However, due to EC consortia
subsidization," Airbus has been able to threaten the U.S. civil aviation
industry's economic position because its start-up costs and losses were
supported and covered primarily by funds received from member state
governments.'
Additionally, unlike Airbus, U.S. civil aircraft manufacturers must bear
the full market risk for the development and production of new civil
aircraft.4 This limits the U.S. civil aircraft industries' profit margins and
ability to invest in new technologies for future competition. Airbus, through
33. Id.; Michael Borrus & Judith Goldstein, Symposium: The Political Economy of
International Trade Law and Policy: United States Trade Protectionism: Institutions, Norms,
and Practices, 8 J. INT'L L. BuS. 328, 332 (Fall, 1987).
34. See Robert Z. Lawrence & Robert E. Litan, The World Trading System After the Uruguay
Round, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 247, 256 (1990).
35. See id.
36. See id; Gellman, supra note 7, at A-6.
37. Gellman, supra note 7, at 5-1.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See generally Gellman, supra note 7, ch. 2. This will also be the case with other EC high-
tech consortia that compete with U.S. high-tech industry.
41. See generally Gellman, supra note 7, ch. 5.
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government subsidies, does not have to bear these risks.' Therefore, the
U.S. civil aircraft industry has been imminently threatened with material
economic injury from the consortia because of its subsidization.
B. Subsidies Given to Airbus
One interesting avenue that EC consortia take and will continue to take,
as demonstrated by Airbus, is that subsidies do not directly flow from
member state governments to the consortia, but instead run from member
state governments to the member companies of the consortium.' The
member state governments transfer these monies to the consortia members
in various forms."
These subsidies include, but are not limited to: development and launch
grants for programs; funding of research programs for development intended
to support the consortium and its programs; equity infusions and loans; and
exchange-rate guarantees.' In future high-tech EC consortia, as with
Airbus, only a nominal amount of these funds will be repaid to member state
governments. Additionally, those funds that are repaid might not be repaid
at a commercial rate of return.' EC high-tech consortia that compete with
U.S. industry are likely to receive similar types of subsidies as those received
by Airbus.
C. Actions to Date
Despite the past injury and the threat of material injury facing Boeing
and McAir with each aircraft Airbus sold, there was surprisingly little action
taken by the U.S. to protect its domestic industry.
In 1984, the U.S. began negotiations with the EC to limit and eventually
eliminate subsidies paid to Airbus. 47  This process lingered on for years
with U.S. accusations of domestic subsidies paid to the consortium by its
member state governments."
Meanwhile, the U.S. civil aircraft industry sat quietly on the sidelines
watching Airbus displace McAir from its number two position in the
42. 1991 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, Office of the United
States Trade Representative, at 78 (1991).
43. See generally Gellman, supra note 7, ch. 2.
44. E.g., loans and research and development grants.
45. Airbus has also received various other subsidies. See generally Gellman, supra note 7,
ch. 2 (not every member state government has given each type of subsidy).
46. See Gellman, supra note 7, at 1-12.
47. Hearing of the Technology and National Security Subcommittee of the Joint Economic
Committee-Foreign Investment in Aviation, Federal News Service, Feb. 27, 1992 available in
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industry. Even then, the U.S. government and the domestic civil aircraft
industry did nothing more than continue its informal negotiations."9
The United States' position of inaction did not change until it discovered
an export subsidy granted to Airbus by the German government in the form
of an exchange-rate guarantee program.' The U.S. quickly brought an
action against Germany to GATT for resolution over Germany's granting of
an export subsidy to the German Airbus partner." Only after this event did
the U.S. take the initiative to file an action for Consultation in GATr against
Airbus' domestic subsidization.52 While the earlier action apparently was
resolved, the latter action sat, a victim of international politics. 3
Finally, on April 1, 1992, a "tentative agreement" was announced
between the U.S. and the EC on EC and U.S. domestic subsidization limits
to the civil aircraft sector in general, and EC subsidization limits to Airbus
in particular.'M It was officially signed on July 17, 1992 thus presumably
ending the latter GATT action and closing the Airbus subsidization issue.55
Interestingly, barely a week went by over the past eight years of talks
where the U.S. domestic industry did not vocally complain about Airbus and
its unfair encroachment in the civil aircraft market. However, the U.S. civil
aviation industry did not take any official action itself. This author urges that
future U.S. high-tech industries facing a subsidized EC consortia refrain
from Boeing's and McAir's misguided ways, and instead fight the consortia
under the U.S. unfair trade laws.'M
49. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 24438 (June 7, 1989) (the U.S. refused to act officially (under
Super 301) against domestic subsidies provided to Airbus since it felt that bilateral and
multilateral negotiations were the appropriate forum).
50. One possible reason the U.S. may have pursued this action is because export subsidies
have in the past been primarily applied on agricultural, not industrial products. Therefore, the
U.S. may have been trying to stop industrial export subsidies from gaining a foothold in the
realm of acceptability in international trade. See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATF: LAW
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 266 (1970).
51. Michael Harrison, GA TT Rules Against Europe in Airbus Subsidy Row, THE INDEPENDENT,
Jan. 16, 1992, at 24.
52. GATT Subsidies Committee Agrees to Hear U.S. Complaint Against EC Airbus Funding,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 579 (Apr. 17, 1991).
53. See id. The U.S.-German GATT action only appeared to be resolved because the EC
rejected the decision. EC Rejects Panel on Airbus Exchange Rates, Germany Suspends
Arrangement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 1, 1992, at 10.
54. U. S., EC Reach "Tentative " Agreement on Curbing Civil Aviation Subsidies, Int'l Business
Daily (BNA) (Apr. 2, 1992) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File.
A possible reason that the Airbus domestic subsidy issue was resolved was that the
Congress had become extremely nervous about the proposed McAir-Taiwan joint venture, which
McAir claims is necessary for it to afford to build future aircraft that will keep it competitive
in the world marketplace. Hearing of the Technology and National Security Subcommittee of
the Joint Economic Committee-Foreign Investment in Aviation, supra note 47 (Congress feared
that such a joint venture could lead to the creation of a Taiwanese Airbus).
55. Agreement Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,
available at Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President,
Washington, D.C. 20506 [hereinafter Civil Aircraft Agreement].
56. See infra Section IV.
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II. CHARGES AGAINST AIRBUS INDUSTRIE IN GATT
The actions that have been brought in GATT against Airbus demonstrate
the legal uncertainty, the tactic of delay and the political implications of
using GATT as a forum to combat a subsidized EC consortia. These
problems were compounded since the U.S. government initiated these GATT
actions on its own accord, without the use of a U.S. statutory basis," such
as Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which delineates time limits and
actions the government must take in GATT. Accordingly, the Executive
Branch has had utmost control over the pace and direction of these actions.
A. GA 7T and Subsidies
GATT is a multilateral agreement that governs most aspects of
international trade. 58  It also provides a forum for multilateral trade
negotiations and dispute resolution among its Signatories.' Article VI of
GATT authorizes importing member countries to impose countervailing
duties on imported goods to offset subsidies that "cause or threaten material
injury to an established domestic industry. . ."I
Article VI was expanded in 1980 to "reduce or eliminate the trade
restricting or distorting effects of non-tariff measures." 61 Hence, the GATT
Subsidies Code was established as the governing international legal regime
relating to subsidies.62 The U.S. and the EC member states are parties to
GAT and the Subsidies Code.'
The Subsidies Code differentiates between the use of "export subsidies"
which are linked directly to export activity, and "domestic subsidies."'
The Subsidies Code further distinguishes between subsidies paid on
57. This was problematic for U.S. industry since the U.S. government had control over the
pace and the course of the GAIT action. See infra Section IID.
58. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 42nd Report 1990, U.S. ITC Publication
2403 (July 1991).
59. Id. There are 108 signatories to GATT. See Keith Bradsher, Progress in Trade Talks with
Europe, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1992, at D1.
60. Theodore W. Kassinger, Regulation of International Trade Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVJ and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT Subsidies Code), 1 B.D.I.E.L. 79 (Nov. 1989); see William Lay, Redefining Actionable
"Subsidies" Under U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1991);
Kenneth W. Abbott, Regulation of International Trade The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 3 (Nov. 1989).
61. Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204
Preamble [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
62. THOMAS J. SCHEONBAUM, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAIUNG DUTIES AND THE GATT:
AN EVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFIED REMEDY FOR UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 16 (Dean Rusk Center Monograph 1987).
63. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GAT].
64. SCHEONBAUM, supra note 62, at 16-17.
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"primary" products and on nonprimary or industrial products.' This
portion of the article examines export and domestic subsidies paid on
nonprimary industrial products in GATT focusing upon such monies paid to
Airbus from member state governments. However, similar government
subsidies will also be a concern for other U.S. high-tech industries that are
facing a subsidized EC consortia.
B. GA IT and Export Subsidies
The U.S. government brought an action in GATr in February of 1991
against the German government in the context of privatizing Messerschmidt-
Boelkow-Blohm ("MBB") and its wholly owned subsidiary, Deutsche Airbus,
an Airbus partner.' The privatization of MBB through a Daimler-Benz-
MBB merger was made conditional on the (West) German government's
ability to cover the financial risks of current and future Airbus projects.67
One element of the government support plan was an exchange-rate-guarantee
scheme covering Airbus aircraft sales until the year 2000, which took the
form of an exchange credit insurance program.' Since 1989, the German
government used this program to offset adverse exchange-rate fluctuations
between the Deutschemark, in which production costs were incurred, and the
U.S. dollar, the currency of the civil aviation market.' Because this
payment arrangement allowed MBB to pay low premiums back to the
German government, it gave MBB more coverage against currency
fluctuations than, for instance, if it was self-insured. 7°
1. The Action71
Export subsidies are prohibited on nonprimary products under the
Subsidies Code.' Therefore, if a GATT Signatory finds that another
65. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, arts. 9 and 10. Primary products are defined as "any
product of farm, forest or fishery." GATT, Art. XVII(B)(l); see Subsidies Code, supra note
61, art. 9. By implication, nonprimary products include all other items for purposes of the
Subsidies Code.
66. Operation of the Trade Agreement Program, 41st Report, 1989, U.S. ITC Publication
2317, 96-97 (Sept. 1990).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Harrison, supra note 51, at 24.
70. Telephone conversation with Dr. Maurice R. Manner, Professor of Business and
Economics at Marymount College, Tarrytown, New York, on March 1, 1992.
71. While the arguments submitted by the Parties and the final decision of the GATT Dispute
Resolution Panel remain confidential, some facts are available through news reports and certain
assumptions can be made.
72. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, art. 9; Material injury to an industry because of the export
subsidy is also a requirement for an export subsidy to be found. Identification of "export
subsidies" is defined by the Subsidies Code providing an illustrative list of subsidies. However,
there is uncertainty over the list's status as it was not adopted formally by the Signatories. See
1992]
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Signatory has granted an export subsidy, they have the right to bring an
action in GATI for Consultation.' If a mutually acceptable solution is not
reached in thirty days, the Signatory may request Conciliation and ultimately
move for Dispute Settlement.7' This is the mechanism the U.S. utilized in
bringing the German exchange-rate mechanism to Dispute Resolution in
GATI.
The U.S. alleged in GAT' that the German exchange-rate guarantee
program was an export subsidy and was therefore inconsistent with the
Subsidies Code.' The U.S. claimed that this export subsidy was worth
US$2.5 million on each Airbus aircraft delivered in 1990.76 The wider
U.S. complaint is that Airbus has received more than $13.5 billion in
subsidies.'
In response Germany and the EC argued that the exchange-rate support
scheme was necessary to enable the transfer of Deutsche Airbus from state
control into the private sector.7' This, they claimed, was consistent with
the Subsidies Code.' The German defense was ultimately rejected.
A GATT disputes panel found, in a January 15, 1992 ruling, the
exchange-rate guarantee given to the German Airbus partner breached
international trade rules under the Subsidies Code.s' Presumably, the
violation that was found was the German government's exchange-rate
guarantee program was an export subsidy under the Annex to the Subsidies
Code, section (j). Section (j) lists insurance programs for exchange rates that
are used to guard against "increases in the costs . . .of exchange risk
programmes, at premium rates, which are manifestly inadequate to cover the
Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GAIT Adjudication Procedures: the Lessons of the DISC Case,
72 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1452 (1988) [hereinafter Hudec, Reforming GATI (despite the
requirement of bi-level pricing in Article 16(4), by adopting the Subsidies Code and stating in
art. 9(1) that "Signatories shall not grant export subsidies on products other than certain primary
products" GAT1" did away with the bi-level pricing requirement) (citations omitted); id. at 1473-
81 (bilateral pricing held in a round-about-way not to be a viable defense for an export subsidy
in the DISC case, since it must have happened in a few cases and because interest free-deferral
of tax liability was part of the Illustrative List of export subsidies, it was presumed to have
occurred); id. at 1474-81 (legislative history to GATT indicates that export subsidies were to be
prohibited outright).
73. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, art. 12.
74. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, art. 17 and 18.
75. Id.; see GATT Subsidies Comminttee Agrees to Hear U.S. Complaint Against EC Airbus
Funding, supra note 52, at 579. Presumably, the U.S. also argued that its domestic industry
was materially injured or threatened with material injury because of the exchange-rate guarantee
program.
76. Harrison, supra note 51, at 24.
77. Id.
78. Paul Betts, Dispute over Subsidy for Airbus Intensifies, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1992, at 6.
79. Id.
80. McDonnell Douglas Asks U.S. to Broaden Airbus Subsidy Charge, supra note 13;
Harrison, supra note 51, at 24; Betts supra note 78, at 6.
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long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes" as an example of
an export subsidy that is inconsistent with GATT. 81
2. Success or Failure
Despite the success of the U.S. in its action over the German exchange-
rate guarantee in GATT, there was a negative aspect to this decision-its
effectiveness.' This decision was ineffective because the adoption of the
ruling' in the GATT Council was blocked by the EC.s4 This tactic used
by the EC is likely to reoccur in future actions against EC consortia because
it was an effective way for the consortia to retain the benefit of the subsidy
without being found in violation of GATT.
The probable reason why the EC blocked the GAIT decision is strategic:
it served to lessen the effect of action taken against it if it lost on the second
U.S. GATT complaint concerning the overall level of member state
government subsidies given to Airbus." Therefore, despite the Panel
decision in this action, the U.S. civil aircraft industry was possibly left in the
same place that it started-competing against a consortia that receives large
export subsidies.' Fortunately for the U.S. civil aircraft industry, the EC
Commission approved an agreement with the U.S. in July of 1992 that will
end the German exchange rate subsidies." Such an agreement, however,
is not guaranteed in future actions.
81. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, at annex. As of the date of the publication of this article,
the GATT panel ruling originally rendered against Germany was not released, therefore this
author is not certain that the German government was found to have violated Section (j) of the
Annex to the Subsidies Code.
82. Another negative aspect to this decision, namely the lack of an enforcement mechanism
in GATT, will be discussed in Section II(C)(l).
83. Export subsidies were not covered in the "tentative agreement" between the EC and the
U.S. reached on April 1, 1992. U.S., EC Reach "Tentative" Agreement on Curbing Civil
Aviation Subsidies, supra note 54.
84. ECRejects Panel on Airbus Exchange Rates, Germany Suspends Arrangement, INSIDEU.S.
TRADE, May 1, 1992, at 10; see Harrison, supra note 51, at 24 (the EC has hinted that it may
object to the ruling arguing that aircraft manufacturers should be governed by the GAIT Civil
Aircraft Code, not the Subsidies Code); see also Betts, supra note 78, at 6; Hudec, Reforming
GATT, supra note 72, at 1489-90 (the panel only makes recommendations that are then
forwarded to the GAIT signatories or the GATT Council, which alone have the right to make
authoritative rulings). But see Panel Decides German Payments to Airbus Consortium
Contravene GATT, Sources Say, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Jan. 17, 1992) ("GATT officials said
they did not expect the EC to challenge the ruling.")
85. Harrison, supra note 5 1, at 24.
86. The tentative agreement over civil aircraft subsidization between the U.S. and the EC
neglects to mention export subsidies.
87. Michael Mecham, Germany Shifts Deutsche Airbus Shares as Part of Subsidy Trade Off,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 20, 1992, at 25.
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C. Airbus Domestic Member State Subsidies and GATT
1. The Second Complaint
Filed in May 1991, the second U.S. complaint covered all member state
government domestic subsidies given to Airbus over the past twenty years.8U
It alleged that Airbus had received more than US$13.5 billion in domestic
subsidies from the governments of member states from 1968 to 1989. This
equals as much as US$26 billion because of easy repayment terms.89
However, the complaint was not aggressively pursued by the U.S. in the
context of GATT. This inaction was typical of the eight long years of
negotiations over the domestic subsidization of Airbus.
a. Legal Reasons for Delay. There are several possible legal reasons
for the U.S. failure to expeditiously pursue the action against Airbus
domestic subsidization in GATT. The most likely rational is the ambivalence
expressed in the Subsidies Code concerning domestic subsidies.' Under
GATT, domestic subsidies are not per se prohibited. 9 To the contrary, the
Subsidies Code recognizes that domestic subsidies are "widely used as
important instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy
objectives and that it [GAT'T] does not intend to restrict the right of
signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and other important policy
objectives ... they consider desirable. "I
This ambivalence is compounded by GATT's unclear definition of the
term "domestic subsidy."' Although the Subsidies Code enumerates
various types of domestic subsidies in Article II, they are not expressly
actionable.' The ambiguity over the definition of domestic subsidies stems
from the Signatories' different conceptions regarding the proper role of
government in the economy.95 Because of the lack of a firm definition, i.e.
the fact that the Subsidies Code only enumerates, but does not explicitly
define domestic subsidies, successful U.S. GATT action against Airbus was
uncertain.
There is another legal problem under GATT. Had the EC or the Airbus
member state governments chose to block a Disputes Panel ruling against
88. Deadlines Approach for Two GA7T Airbus Complaints, Boeing Official Tells ABA, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1628 (Nov. 6, 1991).
89. Harrison, supra note 51, at 24; Boeing Has no Comment on GAIT Panel Report,
REUTERS, Jan. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
90. See Hudec, Reforming GATT, supra note 72, at 1449-50; Lay, supra note 60, at 1496.
91. Lay, supra note 60, at 1496.
92. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, art. 11(1). This includes, "to encourage research and
development programmes, especially in the field of high-technology industries," an area that
Airbus member state governments have contributed largely to. Id. art. 1 l(l)(d).
93. See Lay, supra note 60, at 1496-98 ("nowhere in the GATT is 'subsidy' defined.").
94. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, art. 11(3).
95. See Abbott, supra note 60, at 5.
[Vol. 23
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Airbus, the subsidies paid to Airbus would not necessarily have ceased.'
Even if a ruling against Airbus was agreed to by all of the GATT Signato-
ries, there was still another problem, namely that GATT adjudication
procedures are generally "governed by the practice of consensus decision
making."' This often leads to vague decisions that allow Signatories to
take advantage of gaps in rulings because, for instance, the violating conduct
is not completely prohibited or identified in the ruling."
Of perhaps greater importance, if a Signatory does not comply with a
GATT decision, there is no true enforcement mechanism." The Subsidies
Code provides that if the Committee finds that a Signatory is bestowing
subsidies in opposition to the Code, it will recommend the elimination of the
subsidy."' Since this is only a "recommendation,""' there is no legal
requirement that the affected Signatory conform its behavior to a GATT
decision. If the subsidy is still not eliminated, the Subsidies Code empowers
the Committee to authorize appropriate countermeasures, including the
withdrawal of GATT concessions or obligations. 2  However, this is a
drastic action for GAT, 1 ' and it could still fail to rectify the subsidization
issue."° It could also endanger the existence of GATT itself. 5
b. Political Reasons for Delay. There are also political reasons for the
inaction by the U.S. in GATT over the domestic subsidization of Airbus."°
96. See Hudec, Reforming GAIT, supra note 72, at 1484 (where Parties to a dispute blocked
a decision on the territoriality principle of tax, this action limited what the definition of an export
subsidy was under GAIT).
97. Hudec, Reforming GATT, supra note 72, 1462-63; see Robert E. Hudec, "Transcending
the Ostensible": Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 211, 213 (1987) [hereinafter Hudec, Transcending].
98. Hudec, Reforming GA7T, supra note 72, at 1470; see also Lawrence & Litan, supra note
34, at 251.
99. Hudec, Transcending, supra note 97, at 214; Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement
after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159-67 (1980).
100. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, art. 13(4).
101. Id.
102. GATT, supra note 63, art. 23. This has only occurred once. Report of Working Party
on Netherlands Action Under Article X711(2) to Suspend Obligations to the U.S., in B.S.I.D.,
Supp. 1, at 62 (1953).
103. In all but one action, GAT declined action for retaliation. J. KOLASA, LAw-MAKING
AND LAW-ENFORCEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE GAT
EXPERIENCE 30 (1976); see United States v. Netherlands, B.S.I.D., Supp. 1, at 32 (1953)
(GAT found U.S. dairy policies to be a violation of art. 23 as the U.S. refused to comply with
the ruling and GAT permitted the Netherlands to limit like imports from the U.S.).
104. See id.
105. For example, by withdrawing GATT concessions or obligations the nation that is subject
to such action will have greater incentive to continue its misbehavior in international trade
because it may have no benefit to gain by conforming to the behavior mandated by the
agreement.
106. Other political problems included the EC's insistence that this action be resolved under
the GATT Civil Aircraft Code [Airbus Consortium Countries Pledge to Negotiate with U.S. in
GATT Framework, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 978 (June 26, 1991)] and that the EC produced
a report which alleged the U.S. had given its domestic civil aircraft industry domestic subsidies
13
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First, the U.S. may have been fearful of jeopardizing trade relations with the
EC as it moves toward closer political and economic cohesion. The U.S.
may have been concerned that if it took a tough stance against Airbus
subsidization, the EC would enact stringent trade counter measures which
would adversely affect American exports to the EC, most notably civil
aircraft, the largest U.S. export.1" Therefore, the U.S. may have felt the
civil aircraft industry and the U.S. economy would not benefit from attacking
Airbus subsidization in GATT.
Second, politics are the vehicle by which most trade disputes get
resolved in GATT."°  It is not surprising that United States Trade Repre-
sentative ("USTR") Carla Hills wanted, and received, a negotiated settlement
of the Airbus issue. She stated that she considered this solution better than
litigation."°
through military and space programs. Airbus Allegations that U.S. Firms Receive Subsidies are
Diversion Attempts, USTR Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 532 (Apr. 13, 1988).
U.S. civil aircraft manufacturers argued that they could not assign commercial aircraft costs
to a military program and even if they could, the profit margins that they receive on military
contracts are small.
The United States has given the following rebuttal answers to Airbus' charges of U.S.
subsidization:
* strict U.S. law prevents the use of [Department of] [D]efense expenditures for
subsidizing private commercial activities;
* the Defense Department recoups the cost of research conducted by civil aircraft
contractors on a pro rata basis;
* the government requires a recovery-of-cost provision to recoup its investment in
cases where NASA's research and development programs offer significant consumer
potential for market sales;
* Airbus member governments also provide research funding for military research
projects and civilian aeronautical research; and
* military and other government business conducted by Airbus exceeds similar
business conducted by Boeing or McDonnell Douglas over recent years by a
substantial margin.
Id.
107. Industry and Trade Summary: Aircraft, Spacecraft and Related Equipment, U.S. IC
Publication 2430 (ME-l) (Nov. 1991).
108. For example, the U.S. and the EC are currently playing tit-for-tat over alcoholic imports
from the EC in trying to reach an agreement on EC subsidization levels for this and other
products. Keith Bradshaw, Caught in the Crossfire of Trade War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1992,
at D 1; see also Attorneys See Environmental Issues as Element of Future Trade Discussions, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1206 (Aug. 14, 1991).
109. See Dryden, supra note 12, at 1; Attorneys See Environmental Issues as Element of Future
Trade Discussions, supra note 108, at 1206; U.S., EC Reach "Tentative" Agreement on Curbing
Civil Aviation Subsidies, supra note 54. The actual agreement was signed under the direction
of acting USTR Michael H. Moskow. USTR, Fact Sheet: U.S. and EC Sign Trade Agreement
on Commercial Aircraft, July 17, 1992 [hereinafter Fact Sheet] available at Office of the United
States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. 20506. For
a discussion of the negotiated settlement see infra Section III(A).
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Another probable political reason for the U.S.'s inaction was to allow
time for voluntary compliance."' Governments often use delay tactics in
GATT disputes in hopes the other nation will voluntarily eliminate the unfair
trade measure in question before any official action is taken.1 While
GATT gives certain time periods in the Subsidies Code, these only delineate
when action can be taken, as opposed to when actions must be taken.112
The tactic of delay is often used by Signatories in GATT to allow trade
practices to "disappear" and save a complaining country from taking
politically unattractive litigious actions." 3 This appears to have been at
least a part of the U.S. strategy used against Airbus' domestic subsidization.
Thus, the U.S. action against the domestic subsidies of Airbus was
unlikely to reach fruition in GATT. The apparent causes of this inaction lead
to the conclusion that GATT is a relatively ineffective forum to address an
EC subsidized high-tech consortia because these same problems will likely
reoccur in any U.S. government self-initiated action in GATT over domestic
subsidies. Hence, the domestic industry may find, in the long-run, the U.S.
unfair trade laws better suited to defend against this type of EC trade
practice.
Ill. THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF AIRBUS
A. The Agreement
The Airbus domestic subsidization issue had been solved, at least
between the U.S. and the governments of the EC. On April 1, 1992 a
tentative bilateral agreement was reached over domestic subsidies given to the
civil aircraft industry, focusing in particular on domestic subsidies given to
Airbus." 4 This agreement was officially signed by the parties on July 17,
1992."1' The agreement provides for a "cap" on member state government
support to Airbus (and to U.S. industry) for developing all new civil aircraft
programs. The "cap" is thirty-three percent of the program's total develop-
ment costs." 6  The U.S. had estimated that the previous level of such
110. See Hudec, Transcending, supra note 97, at 217-19 ("[B]oth politicians and diplomats
regard tomorrow as the preferred time for dealing with unanswerable problems. Some tomorrow
are particularly propitious, such as the one that occurs the day after the trade problem has
subsided and the offending measure has been withdrawn.").
111. See id.
112. See, e.g. Subsidies Code, supra note 61, art. 13(1) and (2); see also Robert E. Hudec,
Thinking about the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POuCY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdesh Bhajwahic & Hugh
T. Patricks eds., 1990).
113. See Hudec, Transcending, supra note 97, at 217-19.
114. Roger Cohen, U.S. and Europe Agree on Limits to Subsidies for Aircraft Makers, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at AI (it appears likely that both the Bush administration and Brussels will
approve the agreement).
115. Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 55.
116. Id. art. 4; Fact Sheet, supra note 109, at 2.
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support by member state governments of the consortia was approximately
sixty to seventy percent of production costs.117 U.S. cross-over military
support, that the EC has claimed Boeing and McAir receive, is also limited
to three to four percent.""
The agreement also provides for "transparency requirements for
verification" on subsidies received by the civil aircraft industry. 9 Howev-
er, the agreement is far from perfect as it applies only to future support, as
opposed to support on past and current projects.' 2
B. U.S. Justification for Agreement
This section discusses two justifications that may have led the United
States to reach an agreement on the subsidization of Airbus.
1. Exports Exceed Imports
The first possible justification for the U.S. entering into an agreement
with the EC over the domestic subsidization of Airbus was to protect U.S.
competitiveness. U.S. civil aircraft manufacturers rely on exports more than
domestic sales to keep them financially sound.' It is therefore very
important for the U.S. civil aircraft industry to be allowed to freely market
its goods on a world-wide basis, including in the EC.
If the U.S. had carried out the GATT action or started an action, under
the U.S. unfair trade laws, it is likely the EC would have retaliated by
enacting protectionist trade measures detrimental to U.S. civil aircraft
manufacturers' export of products to the EC. The Bush Administration's
agreement with the EC may have been developed as protection from EC
retaliatory measures that would have stemmed from a successful GATT
action or action under the U.S. unfair trade laws. These measures would
117. Cohen, supra note 114, at Al. Though, in announcing the Civil Aircraft Agreement, the
U.S. placed previous member state government support for development and production costs
at 75 to 100 percent. Fact Sheet, supra note 109, at 2.
118. Id. Presumably, this would also apply to the EC if member state governments of Airbus
chose to finance the consortia in this manner. Fact Sheet, supra note 109, at 3; Civil Aircraft
Agreement, supra note 55, art. 5.
119. The transparency requirements that are subject to the agreement include, but are not
limited to: supplying a complete list of commitments already disbursed or committed;
information on disbursements and repayments for Airbus programs; and any changes to these
commitments which renders its terms and conditions more favorable to Airbus. Fact Sheet,
supra note 109, at 2-3; Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 55, art. 8.
120. See generally Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 55, art. 2. For a discussion on the
status of export subsidies see Section II(B)(2).
121. See Industry and Trade Summary: Aircraft, Spacecraft and Related Equipment, I.T.C.
Publication 2430 (ME-I) (Nov. 1991) (the U.S.'s largest export in terms of monetary value is
civil aircraft); Fact Sheet, supra note 109, at 5 ("[iln 1991, the U.S. shipped $7 billion of large
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have effected the domestic industry's competitiveness abroad by decreasing
their marketshare.2
2. Airbus' Aim is Third Countries
The second justification revolves around the possibility that Airbus' real
commercial aim is to develop third country" 3 markets for its aircraft. The
saturation of third country markets by Airbus aircraft, especially if subsidized
at the levels in effect prior to the agreement, could have devastating effects
on the U.S. civil aircraft industry.
While a successful resolution of the current GAT" action could have
rectified this subsidization issue, a U.S. victory was barely assured due to the
political nature of the arena. And, even if the U.S. pursued an action under
the U.S. unfair trade laws, its remedy would not reach the problem of
subsidization of Airbus aircraft in third country markets. Therefore, the
Bush Administration may have decided that a predictable level of subsidiza-
tion was preferable to unrestrained subsidization in third country mar-
kets. 12
C. Problems with the Airbus Agreement
While this agreement may appear to be a significant step in rectifying the
Airbus domestic subsidization issue, in fact the U.S. is condoning the
subsidization of Airbus, while winning little in exchange."n First, Airbus
will continue to cover one-third of its development costs with subsidies
provided by member state governments. This does not amount to "a level
playing field" for the U.S. civil aircraft industry."
Second, while the agreement provides for transparency in financial
information concerning subsidies given to Airbus, this is not guaranteed,
since Airbus was formed under a French law that does not require financial
disclosure."7 Therefore, it is not unrealistic to assume that the consortia
122. Though under the Civil Aircraft Agreement, the U.S. aircraft industry may still bring,
with some political difficulty, a suit under the U.S. unfair trade laws. This however, gives the
EC the right to abrogate the agreement. Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 55, art. 10.
123. Third countries for the purpose of this article are all nations excluding the U.S. and those
nations that form the EC.
124. For example, the Civil Aircraft Agreeent, supra note 55, annex 1, Interpretation of
Article 4 of the GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft by Signatories of the Agreement, art.
4.4, prohibits the EC and the U.S. from providing inducements "which would create
discrimination against suppliers from any signatory." See also id. art. 4.2.
125. Cohen, supra note 114, at Al quoting Sen. John C. Danforth.
126. But see Fact Sheet, supra note 109, at 1 quoting Acting USTR Michael H. Moskow("[tlhis agreement represents an important achievement in leveling the playing field for the U.S.
aircraft industry. . ").
127. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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will not be one-hundred percent honest when opening its books to public
scrutiny.'3
Finally, such an agreement, while nominally limiting support to Airbus,
will not rectify market access problems that U.S. industry faces in the Airbus
member states and the other EC countries. In the long term, this agreement
may be a catalyst that will lead to higher tariff rates in the EC for U.S.
exports of civil aircraft."2  Senator John C. Danforth called upon the
Executive Branch to abandon the agreement and to proceed under the U.S.
unfair trade laws to fight Airbus subsidization."3
D. Lessons to be Learned
There are valuable lessons for a U.S. high-technology industry to learn
from the Airbus subsidization scenario in spite of the recent resolution. The
first lesson is that GATI' is a relatively ineffective forum for resolving a
subsidization issue involving an EC consortia. Second, if domestic industry
relies on the U.S. government to solve a subsidization issue with the EC it
may have to wait for years until a politically acceptable agreement is accom-
plished. The third lesson is that even when a political agreement is arrived
at, if it allows the continuation of large subsidization, domestic industry,
while somewhat better off, is still competing on an unlevel playing field.
Finally, as Senator Danforth expressed, such an agreement may lead to high
tariffs in the EC for U.S. manufactured products to counter lost subsi-
dies.13" ' This may effectively block U.S. industry access to EC markets.
IV. U.S. UNFAIR TRADE LAW
United States unfair trade law has as its goal, the advancement of free-
market principles by promoting and maximizing market efficiency. Market
efficiency is achieved when each nation follows free trade principles that
allow them to export the goods they produce most efficiently, and import the
products they can produce only at a higher cost. 32 When foreign nations
and producers frustrate this standard by not complying with the free-market
standard promoted by the U.S., their actions are deemed "unfair" trade
128. See Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 55, art. 8.
129. Cohen, supra note 114, at D5.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See John J. Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and Proposal, 9 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 786-88 (1977).
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practices. 33 The U.S. has enacted a complex system of laws to protect its
industries from such unfair trade practices."
The U.S. countervailing duty law will be examined as an alternative to
bringing an action in GATT against the subsidization of an EC high-tech
consortia. This analysis is concerned with how U.S. law remedies the
deficiencies discussed in the GATT-Airbus context. These inadequacies
include: the ambiguities concerning domestic subsidies; the decision-making
problems; the lack of enforcement mechanisms; the inherent delay; and
political aspects. This section will also examine the International Consortium
provision of the U.S. countervailing duty law. This provision was enacted
specifically to aid the U.S. civil aircraft industry by levying a countervailing
duty against Airbus. 35
This section will also examine Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of
1974; particularly how Section 301 provides a set standard of retaliation and
serves as an effective mechanism for ensuring GATT actions are handled in
a timely manner. Section 301 will also be examined in terms of export
targeting, an additional weapon available under the U.S. trade laws for
domestic industries battling an EC high-tech consortia.
A. The U.S. Countervailing Duty Law
The countervailing duty law" provides a legal weapon for U.S.
industries and government to defend against a foreign, unfair trade practice,
namely, the subsidization of foreign exports to the United States, which are
detrimental to U.S. industry. 137  The U.S. countervailing duty law, based
on GATT and its Subsidies Code, requires that no countervailing duty shall
be imposed upon GATT Subsidies Code Signatories unless the domestic
industry petitioner satisfies two requirements."" First, the International
Trade Administration ("ITA") must find that a signatory of the Subsidies
Code is "providing, directly or indirectly, a subsidy with respect to the
manufacture, production, or exportation of a class or kind of merchandise
133. For example, the U.S. considers the subsidies that the EC pays to local processors of
soybeans, rape seed and sunflower seeds, that work to the detriment of U.S. farmers of the same
commodity, to be an unfair trade practice. Keith Bradsher, supra note 108, at D1; see Daniel
K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV. L. REV. 546,
552-52 (1987).
134. See JOSEPH E. PAITSON, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAJLNG DUTY LAws, 1.01,
1.03-1.04 (International Business & Law Series No. 3 1987) (discussing the development of anti-
dumping and countervailing duty legislation).
135. The Commerce Department Speaks 1990: The Legal Aspects of International Trade, Vol.
2, at 31 (PLI 1990).
136. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671-1671f (1992).
137. Tarullo, supra note 133, at 549; Borrus & Goldstein, supra note 33, at 345.
138. The government can also start an action under the countervailing duty law. See 19
U.S.C. § 1671 (1992).
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imported, or sold for importation into the United States." 1" Second, the
petitioner must satisfy the International Trade Commission ("ITC") that an
industry in the United States "is materially injured,""4 or "is threatened
with material injury ... "141 "by reason of imports of that merchandise or
by reason of sales of that merchandise for importation."42
If these two requirements are met, the countervailing duty law corrects
deviations from free market principles by imposing extra duties that raise the
"low" price of imports to what they should be under normal competitive
market conditions." The U.S. countervailing duty imposed for this
purpose, ideally is equal to the amount of the subsidy and is levied on that
product when it is imported into the U.S.'" Of equal importance for a
U.S. industry in bringing a countervailing duty action is that an importer of
foreign manufactured goods may be adversely affected by a countervailing
duty. This is an especially important consideration for a U.S. industry
facing an EC consortia with a large U.S. market. The consortia will have
to conform to U.S. free-market standards or face duties at the border to
offset the benefit of the subsidy received.
1. Domestic Subsidy
Unfortunately, the GATT Subsidies Code does not clearly define
domestic subsidies nor specifically address their legality. However, GATT
allows the member countries of the Subsidies Code to levy countervailing
duties against subsidies as defined by member nations.'" The U.S. law
provides a clear definition of countervailable subsidies unlike GATT Panel
adjudication. This allows U.S. industry to successfully bring a countervail-
ing duty action against an EC consortia.
U:S. statutorily defined subsidies include any subsidy "if provided...
to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries and
139. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1) (1992). See Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A
Competition-Based Approach, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1153, 1164-65 (1989).
140. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)(A)(i) (1992); Alan Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An
Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 202 (1989).
141. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1992); Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F.
Supp. 640, 649 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
142. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1992); see Wood, supra note 139, at 1164-65.
143. Tarullo, supra note 133, at 549; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,
455-56 (1978) ("The countervailing duty [law] was intended to offset the unfair competitive
advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from . . . subsidies paid by their
governments.").
144. Borrus & Goldstein, supra note 33, at 345 (the rationale behind the countervailing duty
law is that a duty will offset any unfair competitive advantage attained by a foreign manufacturer
or producer due to a foreign government subsidy).
145. Id. One example of a negative effect is that countervailing duties are imposed on a
product at the U.S. border, thus acting as a tax on the import and raising its price in the U.S.
See Keith Bradsher, Caught in the Crossfire of Trade War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1992, at Dl.
146. GATT, supra note 63, art. 4; Subsidies Code, supra note 61, arts. 4, 6 and 11.
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whether paid or bestowed directly on the manufacture, production, or export
of any class or kind of merchandise." "7 The ITA has interpreted this
language to mean that a government benefit (other than an export subsidy)
is not a subsidy unless it is provided to a specific enterprise, industry or
group of enterprises or industries" in a manner inconsistent with normal
commercial considerations.149 Therefore, to determine if a foreign subsidy
is subject to a countervailing duty, the petitioner must satisfy the ITA's two
prong test: 1) the subsidy must be sufficiently targeted "to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries;""5 and 2) the
subsidy must provide an opportunity or advantage to that industry that would
not otherwise be available to them in the marketplace."' The petitioner
must also satisfy the ITC that the U.S. industry in question is threatened
with, or has been materially injured or retarded by, reason of the subsidized
product. '52
The first part of the ITA's test, which is known as the "specificity test"
or the "general availability test," 53 ensures that common activities of
governments are not mislabeled as subsidies." Only a government
program conferring benefits on a specific enterprise(s) or industry(ies) is a
147. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(i) (1992). A list of illustrative domestic subsidies follows the
definition:
(i) The provision of capital, loans or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by
a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or
distribution.
148. Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, at 39,328 (Dep't Comm.
1982) (Commerce reads the statute to apply only to a government benefit given to "one company
or industry, a limited group of companies or industries, or companies or industries located
within a limited region or regions.").
Although non-specific benefits are not specifically excluded from the statutory definition,
the idea that a foreign government benefit is not a subsidy if it is not specific is now solidly
entrenched as a gloss on the statutory language. See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp.
722, 730-32 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) appeal dismissed 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986) vacated
in part 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 664 (1988).
149. Id.; British Steel Corp. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 286, 290 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
150. Although "[n]ominal general availability, under the terms of the law, regulation, program,
or rule establishing a bounty, grant, or subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a basis for
determining that a bounty, grant, or subsidy is not, or has not been, in fact provided to a
specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1992); see also
Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 732 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
151. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1992).
152. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1992).
153. See Sykes, supra note 140, at 205.
154. Id. An example is an irrigation project to benefit all farmers in a given locale. 48 Fed.
Reg. 21,618, 21,621-22 (1983) (Fresh Asparagus from Mexico).
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domestic subsidy.15 The second part of the ITA test serves to "identify
and to quantify the subsidy,"" and involves an examination of whether the
bestowal gave a competitive advantage to the foreign industry or enterprise
involved in international trade.' Both of these tests are conducted on a
case-by-case basis.'5" If member state governments' subsidies to the EC
consortia in question meet the subsidy test of the ITA, the bestowal will be
subject to a countervailing duty if the ITC finds that it has caused material
injury to a competing U.S. industry.'"
As discussed in Section I(B), there are several types of domestic
subsidies that are likely to be bestowed upon high-tech EC consortia by
member state governments. Using two examples from the subsidies given
to Airbus we can examine how the ITA's determination of an improper
subsidy under the countervailing duty law works to the benefit of U.S.
industry. For simplification purposes, the subsidy will be treated as a single
composite subsidy. In actual practice, each member state government's
contribution to the consortia would have to be examined by the ITA
independently.
First, a large amount of support from member state governments to
Airbus includes funding for research and development of aircraft components
and equipment. These grants are likely to appear in other EC consortia since
high-tech industries need to develop state of the art technology to keep their
products competitive in the market place. Government subsidy of Airbus is
established by tracing this support from Airbus member state government
budgets."W The ITA "specificity test" is met because these funds went
only to the aircraft industry or programs intended to support the aircraft
industry, and were not generally available to the marketplace of the member
states involved. 1
The second part of the ITA subsidy test would also be met since
financial support for research and development gives Airbus a competitive
advantage in the international marketplace, by lowering the cost of produc-
tion and decreasing the amount of capital that Airbus had to expend on new
155. See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 732 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985);
PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258, 264 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (holding
that government program is not subject to countervail unless it bestows benefit on a specific class
of industry); Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834, 837-38 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983) (upholding ITA's determination that government subsidy program was not a subsidy
within the meaning of the countervailing duty law unless conferring a benefit upon a specific
enterprise or industry).
156. Sykes, supra note 140, at 204.
157. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1992); see Christoph Lehman, The Definition of
Domestic Subsidy Under the U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 22 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 53, 64 (1986).
158. See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
159. See id.; see also Carlisle Tire Co. v. United States, 4 I.T.R.D. 2017 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983); see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 167ld(b) & 1677 (1992).
160. See generally Gellman, supra note 7, ch. 2.
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product development.162 Therefore, Airbus may have been able to export
its products at a price below that which it would have sold without the
subsidy." Such an occurrence would lead the ITA to determine that
Airbus had received an improper subsidy.
Another form of subsidy given by member state governments to Airbus
is providing capital in the form of loans at below commercial rates. It has
been held that if a government in a "targeted loan program provides funds
below the prevailing market rate, a subsidy exists."" 6  Once again, by
tracing member state government support to Airbus, it appears that the
noncommercial rate loans were targeted loans, since they were provided
exclusively to the civil aircraft industry."s
However, "[t]he government provision of equity does not per se confer
a subsidy."" The ITA will examine if the government investment was
commercially sound at the time it was made.16 7 If it was, it will not be a
subsidy.'T If it was a commercially unsound investment, an improper
subsidy may be found to exist."6 The test is whether "a reasonable
investor could expect a reasonable rate of return on his investment within a
reasonable period of time."" 7  Therefore, targeted loans and grants to
credit worthy companies are improper subsidies. This is only to the extent
that the interest rates or guarantees are below the recipient company's
borrowing experience, at the "national average commercial interest
rate."' 7 ' Such loans give the industry a competitive advantage not normal-
ly available in the marketplace. By examining the financial history of
Airbus, it is reasonable to assume that the ITA would find the loans provided
to Airbus were an unsound investment and inconsistent with commercial
considerations." 2
162. Steven F. Benz, Note, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 695, 704 (Feb. 1990).
163. Id.
164. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 286 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (holding
that the infusion of equity into a corporation in the form of loans, capital and forgiveness of debt
was subject to countervail); see Sykes, supra note 140, at 205 (citations omitted) (the value of
the subsidy is calculated on the basis of the differential between the actual rate and the market
rate, rather than the cost of the subsidy to the government).
165. See generally Gellman, supra note 7, ch. 2; see Comeau Seafoods, Ltd. v. United States,
724 F. Supp. 1407, 1416 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
166. New Steel Rail from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1412, 1413 (1989).
167. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 286 (ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
168. Id.
169. Id. The Court of International Trade upheld the ITA finding of a countervailable subsidy
using this test in British Steel Corp. v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 59 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986);
see also New Steel Rail from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1412, 1416 (1989).
170. Comeau Seafoods, Ltd. v. United States, 11 I.T.R.D. 2039, 2048 (1989) (citations
omitted).
171. Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Steel Products from
Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39304 (Sept. 7, 1982).
172. See Gelman, supra note 7, at 1-12, 4-8.
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The U.S. statutory (and case law) definition of domestic subsidies adds
an element of certainty to countervailing duty actions. If U.S. high-tech
industry can demonstrate that the benefits given an EC consortia meet the
ITA's two prong test and the applicable precedent surrounding the specific
type of subsidy at issue, it should be found to be an improper domestic
subsidy." Because the bulk of monies provided by member states to any
EC consortia will probably mirror those given to Airbus, the affected U.S.
industry should be able to meet the unfair domestic subsidy test under U.S.
countervailing duty law.
2. Decision-Making
Unlike GATT, whose decision-making is largely influenced by
international politics, the governmental agencies administering the U.S.
countervailing duty law are given very little discretion to consider political
factors. There are two reasons why the U.S. statutory scheme does not
permit the type of discretion which would allow the agencies to make
determinations based upon foreign policy views.74 First, there are
numerous methodological approaches to determining whether a countervailing
duty should be levied against a governmental bestowal." For example,
the ITC's "usual methodology for measuring the benefit to a company
receiving a preferential loan . . . is to calculate the difference between such
a loan and a comparable benchmark, allocate that difference over the full
term of the loan, and discount the benefit to the company for a given year
to reflect the changing value of money over time." 76 There is also a right
of review by the Court of International Trade, which determines whether
agency determinations are supported by substantial evidence" or are
173. Of course the petitioner will also have to demonstrate that it was materially injured
because of the subsidization of the import for the domestic subsidy to be countervailable. See
19 U.S.C. §§ 167ld(b) and 1677 (1992).
174. See Jane A. Restani, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit: Introductory Comment: Judicial Review in International Trade: Its
Role in the Balance Between Delegation by Congress and Limitation of Executive Discretion, 37
AM. U.L. REV. 1075, 1085 (1988).
175. See, e.g., Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg.
18,006, 18016-20 (1984) (containing "Subsidies Appendix" which describes certain methodolo-
gies used by ITA in examining grants, loans, loan guarantees and equity); Steel Wire from New
Zealand, 51 Fed. Reg. 31,156 (1986); John H. Jackson, International Law: Perspectives on the
Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1570, 1580 (1984).
176. Saudi Iron and Steel Co. (Hadeed) v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987) (citing Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Argentina, 51 Fed.
Reg. 18,006, 18,016-20 (1984)).
177. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B) (1992); see Comeau Seafoods, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.
Supp. 1407 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989); see also PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 712 F. Supp.
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arbitrary and capricious.' 78 This right of review ensures that the decision-
making agency is not influenced by political considerations. The U.S.
countervailing duty law is a "legalistic system" that gives U.S. industry a
chance to make their claims against foreign subsidization of manufacturers
without U.S. foreign policy interference."
Under U.S. law the member state governments of the EC consortia can
appeal an adverse determination, but cannot block a decision for political
reasons." 8 In a politically charged countervailing duty action, this aspect
of U.S. law can serve to protect U.S. industry's interests much better than
GATT where a Panel decision can be rejected by a Party to the action.
3. Time
In contrast to GATI', which has no set time limits, countervailing duty
proceedings statutorily must be completed within "tightly compressed time
frames."" 1 The initial finding on the sufficiency of the petition must be
completed within twenty days.1" A reasonable indication of injury must
be determined within forty-five days of the petition being filed."
After finding a reasonable indication of injury, the time limits in
countervailing duty proceedings are more lenient, but still retard most tactical
delay on the part of the parties and the U.S. government. Within seventy-
five days after the preliminary determination, the ITA must determine if a
subsidy is being granted." Subsequently, the ITC must make its determi-
nation as to material injury of the industry by reason of the subsidization of
the foreign manufacture within the later of: 1) one hundred and twenty days
after the ITA's affirmative preliminary determination; or 2) forty-five days
after the ITA makes an affirmative determination as to the existence of a
subsidy." Next, if the ITA and the ITC both make affirmative determina-
tions, within six to twelve months after the ITA receives "satisfactory"
information upon which the assessment of the countervailing duty shall be
178. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2640(b) (1992) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1992) most
countervailing duty actions are reviewed for substantial evidence. Certain actions, such as an
action not to commence an investigation are reviewed on an arbitrary or capricious or abuse of
discretion standard. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (1992). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1992)
the U.S. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review a final decision of the Court of International
Trade.
179. Jackson, supra note 175, at 1570 (which the author sees as negative).
180. Id.
181. Ronald A. Cass & Stephen J. Narkin, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law: The
United States and the GATT, in DOwN IN THE DUMPS 200, 232-33 (Richard Botuck & Robert
E. Litan eds., 1991).
182. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c) (1992). This includes an initial determination of whether there is
a subsidy. 19 C.F.R. 355.13 (1992).
183. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1992).
184. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(l) (1992); 19 C.F.R. 355.20 (1992).
185. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(2) (1992); 19 C.F.R. 355.21 (1992).
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evaluated, custom officials are to assess the duty to be imposed on the
import.'8
While this is only a brief overview of the time limits required by
countervailing duty law, this demonstrates that U.S. industry will not be
subject to the tactical and political delay involved in GATT proceedings. To
any U.S. high-tech industry that is threatened by an EC consortia, the lack
of delay in granting relief under U.S. law can be an important asset in
pursuing a countervailing duty action. This will also assist in limiting the
potential injury that can be inflicted on the petitioning industry by competing
against a subsidized consortia.
4. Enforcement and Relief
The enforcement and relief provisions of the countervailing duty law also
provide an element of certainty to a U.S. industry that is lacking in GATT.
This is provided by the International Consortia Provision" and the
determination and enforcement provisions.""
a. International Consortium Provision. The 1988 Trade Act introduced
an amendment to the countervailing duty law applicable to international
consortia." The amendment was specifically "crafted" to cover subsidies
paid to Airbus by its member state governments."g This provision,
"permits Commerce to cumulate all subsidies paid by several governments
to consortium members (or to a consortium itself) to produce a single
product" which makes the countervailing duty levied on the import at the
border based upon the total of government support received by the consortia
(minus statutory amounts, as discussed below and in Section (b))."9' This
ensures that the countervailing duty law is an effective weapon for U.S. high-
tech industries fighting the subsidization of EC consortia.
This provision explicitly authorizes the ITA to investigate subsidies
provided during all stages of production by all consortia member state
governments and to cumulate the amounts of the subsidies from all such
countries in its determination of the countervailing duty to be applied to the
imported product." The gross subsidy used in the determination of the
final countervailing duty order is the sum total of all member state govern-
ment support to the EC consortia and its member companies. This method
of calculation will benefit U.S. industry by increasing, under the countervail-
186. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(i) (1992).
187. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(d) (1992).
188. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671d, § 1671e (1992).
189. The Commerce Department Speaks 1990: The Legal Aspects of International Trade, Vol.
2, at 31 (PLI 1991).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 134 Cong. Rec. H1863, 2031-2032 (1988).
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ing duty law, the financial impact of a countervailing duty levied on the
consortia's imported product.
b. Determination and Enforcement. If the ITC finds that a foreign
government or entity is subsidizing the manufacture, production or exporta-
tion of goods imported into the U.S., the ITC issues an affirmative injury
determination." After issuing the affirmative injury determination, the
ITA must impose countervailing duties on the imported goods equal to the
amount of the subsidy." This takes the form of a final countervailing
duty order which directs the U.S. Customs Service to collect countervailing
duties on the subsidized product at the border.1 In its final countervailing
duty order the ITA will calculate a countervailing duty to offset the
subsidy. 1 Under these circumstances, the International Consortia Provi-
sion will specifically aid a U.S. industry facing a subsidized EC consortia.
For example, all subsidies paid to Airbus by France, Germany, Great Britain
and Spain, whether to the consortia or its member companies, would be
cumulated to determine the gross subsidy."
Under the U.S. law, only the "net" subsidy is subject to countervail.'"
For purposes of determining the net subsidy, the ITA subtracts certain
nominal monies from the "gross subsidy" to determine the amount of the net
subsidy.1" Therefore, a countervailing duty is a tax on an import equal to
the amount of the net subsidy on that import. °
193. Which is required when a country is a signatory of GAT. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)
and (b) (the ITA must make a determination as to whether a subsidy is being provided with
respect to the merchandise and the ITC must determine whether a U.S. industry has been or is
threatened with material injury or the establishment of a U.S. industry is materially retarded
because of the product's subsidization).
194. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 et. seq. (1992).
195. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(c)(1) (1992). This enforcement mechanism is an asset because it
ensures that products do not enter the home market without the benefit of the subsidy set-off.
196. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(1) (1992); Sykes, supra note 140, at 205 (the duty should equal
the aggregate amount of all subsidy payments divided by the value or volume of the production
that benefitted form the subsidy).
197. Without the International Consortia Provision, the ITA would be unable to cumulate all
subsidies paid to the consortia and to the member state companies.
198. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(e)(a)(1) (1992).
199. The following shall be subtracted from the gross subsidy:
(A) any application fee, deposit, or similar product paid in order to qualify for, or
to recover, the benefit of the subsidy,
(B) any loss in the value of the subsidy resulting from its deferred receipt, if the
deferral is mandated by government order, and
(C) export taxes, duties, or other charges levied on the export of merchandise to the
United States, specifically intended to offset the subsidy received.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (1992).
200. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)(B) (1992); see Note, James D. Southwick, The Lingering
Problem with the Specificity Test in United States Countervailing Duty Law, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1159 (1988).
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Under the U.S. countervailing duty law, U.S. industry is assured,
(unlike in GATI') of a set standard of relief when competing against a
subsidized EC consortia in its home market. For an EC consortia this
amounts to a substantial duty levied on each of its products imported into the
U.S. market. This in turn leads to a larger loss for member state govern-
ments and the consortia, because under economic principles the higher costs
of the product should decrease sales in the U.S."' Therefore, an EC
consortia might find it more beneficial to have the member state governments
cease subsidizing the organization in order to keep its products commercially
viable in the U.S. marketplace.
5. Is the Countervailing Duty Law Truly Effective?
The countervailing duty law is effective because it is a non-political
forum in which the U.S. industry can espouse its claims against a foreign
subsidized competitor that exports its products to the U.S. The counter-
vailing duty law gives U.S. industry a measure of certainty that is lacking in
the GATT dispute settlement procedure. If a U.S. industry is able to succeed
in a countervailing duty action they will be protected from the subsidized
product in the U.S. market. In a politically charged action (such as Airbus),
the countervailing duty law ensures, by its timing provisions and enforcement
mechanisms, that the law, not politics is the primary driving force of the
action.
The provision in the countervailing duty law that the U.S. government
may suspend a countervailing duty investigation if it is against U.S.
interests,' requires, when initiated by industry petition, an agreement with
the EC consortia member state governments either to: 1) eliminate or offset
the subsidy completely; 2) cease exports of the subsidized merchandise;'
or 3) to eliminate the injurious effect of the exports.' This agreement by
the foreign government 5 must also include that suppression or undercut-
ting of price levels of domestic products by imports of that merchandise will
be prevented and at least eighty-five percent of the subsidy will be off-
set." Therefore, international political considerations which allow
termination of a countervailing duty action in some cases, play only a
balancing role which ensures that U.S. industry gains a more level playing
field.
201. Telephone conversation with Dr. Maurice R. Manner, Professor of Business and
Economics at Marymount College, Tarrytown, New York, on March 1, 1992.
202. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c (1992).
203. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b) (1992).
204. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(1) (1992).
205. Unless the exports cease.
206. 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(2) (1992). It is interesting to note that under the Airbus tentative
agreement, support is reduced at most to fifty percent of the former amount.
[Vol. 23
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However, the countervailing duty law fails to adequately address the
problem of market share. While countervailing duties in one importing
nation give the export government a reason to eliminate the subsidy for that
importer, third country markets remain unaffected.' In other words:
Countervailing duty statutes, by their very nature, cannot completely offset
the benefits conferred by foreign subsidies. Since countervailing suits are
levied at national borders, foreign industries receiving subsidies could still
gain competitive advantage over unsubsidized domestic industry by
exporting goods to third countries that lack a rigorous countervailing duty
law or an incentive to employ one.Ms
The use of countervailing duty law to remedy the effect of foreign subsidies
is of limited value if foreign markets are flooded with subsidized imports.
Despite this limitation in the countervailing duty law, the U.S. will remain
a primary sales target for the consortia's high tech products. The member
state governments may find it beneficial in the long-run to cease subsidization
altogether, rather than face countervailing duties on its products, which could
lead to dramatically decreased sales.'
Another limitation in the U.S. countervailing duty law is that it does not
prevent retaliation by the EC. For example, when the U.S. threatened to
impose countervailing duties on pasta from the EC, the EC threatened
unspecified retaliatory measures instead of removing the subsidy."'0 This
demonstrates that in some cases "[rjetaliation-not acquiescence-is the
predictable reaction by other countries when an internal policy is attacked or
undermined."211
While the countervailing duty law is not the perfect solution to the
subsidization of an EC consortia, U.S. industry may find countervailing
duties particularly useful for assuring commercial viability in the U.S. In
addition, the residual effects of the use of the countervailing duty law may,
in the long-term, cause the subsidization of the consortia to cease completely.
Regardless, the results for U.S. industry are at least more certain than those
in GATr adjudication.
207. Benz, supra note 162, at 722; see Lay, supra note 60, at 1509; see also Richard
Diamond, Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 776
(1989).
208. Benz, supra note 162, at 722 (citations omitted).
209. For example, in the case of Airbus the U.S. is the world's largest market for civil
aircraft. Indusny and Trade Summary: Aircraft, Spacecraft and Related Equipment, I.T.C.
Publication 2430 (ME-I) (Nov. 1991).
210. Wood, supra note 139, at 1169-70 (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 1170.
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B. Section 301
Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 is a unilateral trade provision
aimed at foreign restraints that prevent U.S. goods, services and capital from
entering and competing effectively in foreign markets because of unfair trade
practices. It was enacted to "pry open foreign markets to U.S. invest-
ment and exports of goods and services, "213 and to allow trade retaliation
by the U.S., without the influence of international political consider-
ations. 14 Furthermore, Section 301 provides an impetus for speeding up
GATT negotiations.213
Under Section 301, U.S. industry can lodge a complaint with the United
States Trade Representative ("USTR") using either the mandatory or
discretionary retaliation provisions concerning foreign government practices
that affect U.S. exports and trade.21 6 The USTR is then obligated to study
the complaint and if it is found meritorious, to negotiate and take other
actions in an international context to persuade the foreign government in
question to change its practices.2"7 This makes Section 301 unique, for if
a high-tech Industry is concerned with international considerations, Section
301 gives them the right to have their claims heard in an international
arena. 21  Ultimately, Section 301 gives the USTR power to retaliate using
various measures.
Section 301 is particularly useful in situations like Airbus because it can
effectively force the U.S. government to act against the subsidization of EC
consortia when negotiation or GATT action is stalled. It can also assist in
rectifying the problem of access to the markets of the consortia's member
states.
212. John H. Barton & Bart S. Fisher, Introductory Note to Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988--itle I, 28 I.L.M. 15, 23 (1989). Borrus & Goldstein, supra note 33, at 347.
213. Fusae Nara, Note, A Shift Toward Protectionism Under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade
Act: Problems of Unilateral Retaliation under International Law, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229,
241 (1990) (citations omitted).
214. 134 Cong. Rec, H5532 (daily ed. July 13, 1988).
215. See Thomas 0. Bayard, Comment on Alan Sykes' "Mandatory Retaliation for Breach of
Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J.
325, 326-27 (1990).
216. Borus & Goldstein, supra note 33, at 348 (actions which Section 301 permit may be
taken either on the USTR's own initiative or in response to a petition filed by a private party
with the USTR).
217. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2413-2415 (1992).
218. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1992); see Patricia I. Hansen, Defining Unreasonableness in
International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 96 YALE L.J. 1122 (1987).
219. For example, such retaliatory measures include, but are not limited to suspending,
withdrawing or preventing the application of benefits of trade agreement concessions to that
foreign country or imposing duties or other import restrictions on the goods imported. 19
U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1992).
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In certain cases there is another benefit of bringing a Section 301 action
instead of action under the countervailing duty law.' In mandatory and
discretionary actions, under Section 301,"21 it is not necessary that the
majority of the industry file a petition.' All that is required is that an
"interested person" to file a petition.' An "interested person" is deemed
to be any party who has a significant interest affected by the act, policy or
practice complained of. 4 This includes any party who is representing a
significant economic interest affected directly by the act, policy or practice
complained of in the petition. This is important because high-tech
industries in the U.S. often consist of only a few firms. If the market leader
refuses to act,' the industry will be foreclosed from pursuing an action
under the countervailing duty law. The alternative of Section 301 can
remedy problems in GATT adjudication and provide an additional cause of
action against subsidized EC consortia especially for firms that are not
dominant in their industrial marketplace.
1. Mandatory Action
Mandatory retaliatory action is required by the USTR if the it determines
that U.S. rights under a trade agreement have been violated ' 7 or an act,
220. Another benefit obtained for the domestic industry in pursuing an action for discretionary
retaliation under Section 301 is there is no requirement of a showing of material injury or threat
of material injury as required under the countervailing duty law and a mandatory Section 301
retaliation action concerning subsidization.
221. See Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 670 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (ITA
must dismiss petitions not proven to be affirmatively supported by the majority of domestic
producers in a countervailing duty action). But see Citrosuco Paulista, S.A. v. United States,
704 F. Supp. 1075, 1085 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (ITA has discretion to dismiss, but is not
required to dismiss, petitions that are not shown to be actively supported by a majority of
domestic industry).




226. As it appears that Boeing has in Airbus.
227. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1992). The law also recognizes the political realities to some
degree by providing that the USTR shall make its decision, "subject to the specific direction,
if any, of the President." 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(l) (1992); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 44,970 (1988)
(where the USTR determined in the first case filed under Section 301, as amended, that despite
the apparent illegality of Japan's refusal to import rice under GATr rules, it would not be
effective to initiate a section 301 investigation. The USTR determined the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations would "provide a more effective way to open Japanese rice
markets to U.S. imports.").
Section 301 also provides the USTR with five escape hatches to avoid bringing a
mandatory retaliation action:
1) a finding by a GATT panel that the United States is not being treated illegally by a
foreign country involved; 2) a finding by the USTR that the foreign country is taking
satisfactory measures to solve the problem; 3) action by the foreign country to compensate
the United States; 4) a finding by the USTR in extraordinary cases that taking action under
Section 301 would have an adverse impact on the U.S. economy out of proportion to the
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policy or practice of another government denies the U.S. the benefit of a
trade agreement.m The USTR must then consult with the foreign
government about the issues involved in the action.229 If these consulta-
tions fail to remedy the issues involved, then the USTR must ask for the
dispute resolution that is in the trade agreement.' °
Therefore, if a Section 301 action is brought against a subsidized EC
consortia, pursuant to Section 303, the USTR must refer applicable cases to
GAT7 following consultation with the member state governments.3' If a
U.S. government initiated action is already pending over the subsidization,
as would have been the case with Airbus, then presumably the actions would
be consolidated. In any event there are two benefits for the U.S. industry by
proceeding via mandatory retaliation that are unavailable in a U.S. govern-
ment self-initiated action in GATr: time limits and a statutorily set standard
of retaliation.
a. Time Limits. The first benefit of a mandatory Section 301 action is
the statutory time limits, which provide specified time periods within which
a settlement must be reached and the USTR must take action against the
consortia. Section 301 requires that the USTR reach a mutually acceptable
resolution to the dispute with the foreign country subject to the action within
the earlier of the consultation period in the agreement (including the GATT
Subsidies Code) or one hundred and fifty days after the consultation within
the trade agreement is commenced. 72 If these time limits are not met, then
the USTR must "request proceedings on the matter under the formal dispute
settlement procedures provided under the [trade] agreement."" These
time limits ensure more expedient negotiating procedures than was involved
in the Airbus situation.
Second, Section 301 requires the USTR to make unilateral determina-
tions on the unfair trade issue within twelve months on cases involving trade
agreements, and the GATT Subsidies Code, (even if the "involved" trade
agreement has not been able to adjudicate the dispute in that time).' This
limit ensures that relief will be provided to affected U.S. industry within a
reasonable time period after the petition is accepted by the USTR under
benefits of such action; and 5) a finding by the USTR that retaliation would cause serious
harm to the national security of the United States (taking into account the effect of inaction
on the section 301 program).
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B) (1992); see Barton & Fisher, supra note 212, at 26.
228. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1992).
229. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (1992).
230. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (1992).
231. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (1992); see Barton & Fisher, supra note 212, at 27.
232. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(B) (1992).
233. Id.
234. Barton & Fisher, supra note 212, at 27.
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Section 301. These limits, to some extent, rectify the inherent delay in
GATr.235
b. Retaliation. The form of retaliation that the USTR may take under
Section 301 is discretionary,' however, the amount of retaliation levied
must be equivalent to the burden or restriction imposed on U.S. com-
merce. 37 It is the USTR's ability to retaliate, not the type of retaliation,
that gives Section 301 its strength to remedy unfair trade practices. The
threat of retaliation, more than the actual retaliation itself, make Section 301
an effective weapon for a U.S. industry facing an EC consortia. 38 Merely
starting a Section 301 action may lead the EC consortia to cease subsidization
to avoid retaliation available to the USTR under Section 301.
If the threat of retaliation is ineffective actual retaliation may be effective
in cases where the nation(s) involved rely heavily upon the sale of exports
to the U.S. marketplace. For example, in the Japanese Semi-Conductor
action, after the Japanese failed to implement a trade agreement with the
U.S., President Reagan imposed a one-hundred percent ad valorem duty on
certain Japanese products under the mandatory Section 301 provision.'
This amounted to a virtual ban on the import of these products to the U.S.,
its primary market, causing the Japanese to quickly comply with the original
235. There is still some delay possible under Section 301. See, e.g., Monthly Import/Business
Review, 1991 1TC LEXIS 121 (March 1991) available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library (where the
U.S. pork industry filed a Section 301 petition with the USTR to retaliate on the EC's ban on
U.S. pork, and the USTR after accepting the petition chose to delay action for thirty days during
negotiations with the EC); 19 U.S.C. § 2413(b) (1992); 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(B) (1992); see
also Alan Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on
the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301, 310 (1990) [hereinafter Sykes,
Mandatory Retaliation].
236. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1992); The USTR as a form of retaliation may in either a
mandatory or discretionary investigation:
1) withdraw, suspend or prevent a trade agreement with a foreign country; 2) impose
duties or restrict the import of goods; 3) enter into binding agreements with the
country that will either a) eliminate the act subject to the action, b) eliminates the
burden or restriction on U.S. commerce or c) provide compensation ensuring trade
benefits that satisfies the USTR and provides compensation in benefits to the domestic
industry.
19 U.S.C. § 241 1(c).
The language of Section 301 encourages the USTR to attempt to impose duties before
deciding to restrict imports in mandatory retaliation actions. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(c)(5)(A) (1992);
see Canadian Provincial Practices Affecting Canadian Imports of Beer, 57 Fed. Reg. 308 (1992)
(where Canadian actions found to violate GAIT and no resolution reached, USTR increased
duties on imports of Canadian beer).
237. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Session, 558, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C. §
C.A.N. 1547, 1591; Sykes, Mandatory Retaliation, supra note 235, at 320 (retaliation is
appropriate to bring a violation in line with legal obligations).
238. See Hansen, supra note 218, at 1131.
239. Japanese Semi-Conductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,419 (1987).
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agreement.' °  This example demonstrates that actual retaliation can
effectively force an EC subsidized consortia, with a large U.S. market, to
conform its behavior to U.S. free market principles.
2. Discretionary Retaliation
The USTR is authorized to take discretionary retaliatory action against
"unfair" foreign trade practices which are deemed "unjustifiable," "unrea-
sonable" or "discriminatory." 1 In making its determination, the USTR
must consider: 1) whether the unfair trade practices of the foreign govern-
ment are actionable under Section 301; and 2) whether retaliation is deemed
to be appropriate under the circumstances.' One foreign trade practice
that may be "unreasonable" and therefore actionable under Section 301 is
export targeting.
Export targeting by a foreign government is defined under Section 301
as "any government plan or scheme consisting of a combination of coordinat-
ed actions.., that are bestowed on a specific enterprise, industry, or group
to become more competitive in the export of a class or kind of merchan-
dise."' The House Committee Report states that export targeting typical-
ly consists of:
[A] combination of practices, such as, but not limited to, directing private
capital as well as governmental financial resources to the particular
industry on a preferential basis, establishing an industry cartel, providing
preferential sourcing of government procurement, closing or restricting the
home market to foreign competition or investment in order to provide
special protection during the establishment and development of the indus-
try. 2"
240. Japanese Semi-Conductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,693 (1987) (after the Japanese had complied
the USTR took the initiative to suspend most of the retaliatory measures).
241. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1992) provides:
(b) Discretionary action
If the Trade Representative determines under 2414(a)(1) of this title that -
(a) an act, policy or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory
and burdens or restricts United States commerce, and(b) action by the United States is appropriate, the Trade Representative shall take all
appropriate and feasible action authorized under subsection (c) of this section, subject
to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any such action, and all
other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the President that the
President may direct the Trade Representative to take under this subsection, to obtain
the elimination of that act, policy, or practice.
See Barton & Fisher, supra note 212, at 27.
242. See Naa, supra note 213, at 242. Judith Hipler Balo & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of
the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 1, 3 (1988).
243. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)((3)(E) (1992).
244. House Comm. on Ways and Means, Report on the International Economic Policy Reform
Act of 1987, H.R. Rep. No. 40, 100th Cong. Ist Sess., pt. 1 at 65 (1987).
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There are several reasons why export targeting, as defined in Section
301, is likely to occur in the case of a high-tech EC consortia. First,
consortia fit into the definition of cartels,' an important component of the
House Committee Report's definition. Cartels are of particular concern
because they have substantial market power and can use this power to
exclude competitors from their home markets.' Second, EC consortia are
likely to be subsidized. Therefore, product prices may be lower in the
foreign consortia's home market to assure their success, to the detriment of
U.S. industry. Third, member state governments of EC consortia have
political and economic support agreements that may act to exclude U.S.
industry from competing in the home markets of the member state govern-
ments. This is compounded by the national prestige involved in a high-tech
industry which may also lead the member state governments to allow only
their own product to succeed in member state markets.
An example of this last point is currently occurring in the Airbus context
through political support for the purchase of Airbus aircraft in the EC, which
acts to discriminate against aircraft produced by U.S. industry. u7 Airbus
has recently asked the EC's Competition Commissioner to open an inquiry
into British Airways purchase of aircraft.' The Managing Director of
Airbus, Jean Pierson, alleged that over the past fifteen years British Airways
has ruled out the purchase of Airbus' civil aircraft in favor of Boeing's. 9
This demonstrates that Airbus is seeking preferential market access in
Britain, an Airbus member state, to foreclose a private company's purchase
of U.S. civil aircraft. This is the first step in closing market access to U.S.
civil aircraft manufacturers in Airbus member states. This, combined with
subsidization and the cartel status of Airbus, may have been sufficient to
allow the U.S. industry to bring a successful action for discretionary
retaliation under Section 301.
Similar market access problems will continue for U.S. high-tech industry
in the EC, especially if Airbus is successful on its petition to the EC
Competition Commissioner. The export targeting provision of Section 301
may assist U.S. industries in fighting market access problems encountered in
the subsidized EC consortia's home markets.
a. Retaliation. A party that brings an action for discretionary retaliation
will find the same retaliation procedures are available as in a mandatory
245. Webster's Dictionary defines "cartel" as, "a combination of independent commercial or
industrial enterprises designed to limit competition or fix prices." WEBSTER'S 9TH COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 210 (9th ed. 1983). Hence, EC subsidized consortia, such as Airbus, that are
formed to limit competition in high-tech industry, fit the classical definition of cartels.
246. Telephone conversation with Dr. Maurice R. Manner, Professor of Business and Business
of Marymount College, Tarrytown, New York, on March 4, 1992.
247. The tentative agreement reached on April 1, 1992 over Airbus neglects this issue.
248. Airbus Seeks Inquiry of British Airways' Method of Selecting New Airplanes, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1503 (Oct. 16, 1991).
249. Id.
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Section 301 action.' Once again broad choices are available to the
USTR to remedy the unfair trade practice of the consortia. Interestingly, a
study has found that U.S. retaliatory threats under the discretionary
retaliation provision of Section 301 are particularly effective in encouraging
U.S. trading partners to open their markets to U.S. exports.25' U.S.
industry, by filing an action for discretionary retaliation, may cause the
opening of markets previously closed to the industry in a consortia's member
states.
There is also a provision available under a discretionary retaliation action
that allows the USTR to set up a panel to "recommend measures which will
promote the competitiveness of the domestic industry effected [sic] by the
export targeting."1 2 Upon receipt of such recommendations, the President
may decide if administrative action or legislation is necessary to "restore or
improve the international competitiveness of the domestic industry." 3
The Panel's report must also be given to Congress.' This provision
leaves open the possibility that Congress or the President will implement
legislative measures on its own accord to assist the affected domestic industry
in its plight.
3. Is Section 301 Effective
Section 301 is the only existing trade law with the ability to force the
U.S. government to commence negotiations with foreign nations on existing
foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports. 5 In this respect, it can assist
domestic industry in fighting a subsidized EC consortia in an international
arena. However, the flexibility provided to the USTR under Section 301,
combined with the "escape hatches" on mandatory action, ensures that the
Executive Branch has discretion to take "judicious and trade-liberalizing
actions in a multilateral context."' Section 301 is, therefore, only a
discretionary instrument of the Executive Branch. Despite its "threat"
potential, Section 301 does not require unilateral retaliatory action. As one
author expressed it:
Although section 301 may be the best means currently available to "open
up" closed markets which result in differential pricing, the granting of
relief under Section 301 is in many ways unpredictable. As such, the
250. See supra section IV(B)(1).
251. Bayard, supra note 215, at 325 ("In the twenty-seven Section 301 actions in which
retaliation was threatened or imposed, trade liberalization occurred in about two-thirds of the
cases. . . . Retaliatory threats seem to work against large traders such as the European
Community and against small countries such as Korea and Taiwan").
252. 19 U.S.C. § 2415(b)(1)(A) (1992).
253. 19 U.S.C. § 2415(b)(1)(B) (1992).
254. 19 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (1992).
255. Bornus & Goldstein, supra note 33, at 350.
256. Barton & Fisher, supra note 212, at 28.
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political nature of section 301 often constrains the granting of relief in
certain cases. Given the highly charged nature of U.S. trade relations, it
is likely that a section 301 case will become a political bargaining chip for
the Executive Branch. Efficient, market-oriented resolutions to section 301
cases may prove to be the exception, rather than the rule.
257
Unless the EC is truly fearful of U.S. retaliation being implemented,
Section 301 may prove to be virtually useless. However, even a small
amount of fear of retaliation could be beneficial because most high-tech EC
consortia rely heavily on the U.S. market.
Another problem with a Section 301 action is it does not prevent trade
retaliation from the EC. However, because the United States and the EC
rely so heavily upon each other as trading partners, it is unlikely that trade
retaliation will be the EC's chosen path.'
Like the countervailing duty law, Section 301 is an imperfect weapon for
U.S. industry faced with an EC subsidized consortia. While its biggest flaw
is its discretionary nature, if an action is accepted for mandatory retaliation,
U.S. industry will be all but assured of relatively quick results in GATI" over
the subsidization issue.'3 If an action for discretionary retaliation is
accepted for export targeting, it will serve as an additional weapon, in
combination with a countervailing duty or a mandatory Section 301 action,
to clear the way for market access to the consortia's home markets that have
been blocked to U.S. domestic high-tech industry's imports.
CONCLUSION
This Administration has been so tied up in ideological posturing that it has
never focused on the hemorrhage of high-tech jobs and industries from the
United States. Its trade policies have been totally ineffective in dealing with
the blatantly unfair trading policies of Airbus.' If we had adopted
technology, manufacturing and strategic-trade policies that put American




While some commentators argue that subsidization problems should be
handled by the issuance of agreed upon guidelines of organizations such as
GATT, 2 they fail to consider the fact that certain U.S. industries will
257. Benz, supra note 162, at 742; see Hansen, supra note 218, at 1122-24.
258. C. Michael Hawthorne & Sandra Masur, The Right Emphasis for U.S. Trade Policy in
the 1990's: Positive Bilateralism, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 207, 218 (1990).
259. Or if this fails to resolve the matter, a set statutory standard of retaliation.
260. Though the same statement can easily be applied to any high-tech EC subsidized
consortia.
261. Senator Bingaman, Perspective on Aerospace, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1991, at 1
(discussing the proposed Taiwan-McAir joint venture and finding as the cause, the subsidization
of Airbus).
262. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 139, at 1170.
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cease to exist if no action is taken. This will cause our economy greater
harm than if action is taken by U.S. high-tech industry under the U.S. unfair
trade laws. Nowhere is this so evident than when domestic high-tech
industry is facing a subsidized EC Consortia.
It is not in high-tech U.S. industries' interests to follow the route of
textiles in the 1950s, consumer electronics in the 1960s and steel and
automobiles in the 1980s.1 It is important for U.S. industry to attack the
subsidization of an EC consortia vigorously before the threat of material
injury is manifested. In most cases, these industries should be prepared to
use the U.S. unfair trade laws discussed in this article to achieve a quick and
enforceable remedy or be prepared to face another Airbus, a scenario in
which the U.S. government slowly and ineffectively ran the show in the
international arena as the U.S. aircraft industry followed the path to financial
ruin.
263. These industries were severely adversely effected economically by virtually unrestrained
subsidized imports into the U.S.
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